

Trade Negotiations & U.S. Agriculture: Prospects & Issues for the Future

Parr Rosson
Professor & Director
Center for North American Studies
Department of Agricultural Economics
Texas A&M University






Overview

- International Setting & Trade Strategy
- Role of Trade Agreements
- The World Trade Organization
 - Negotiations in Doha Development Agenda
 - DS 267, 'Cotton Case'
- Conclusions & Implications




International Setting & Trade Strategy




US Census Bureau




GDP Growth Projections






Source: International Financial Statistics January 2005 and projections after 2004 are from Global Insight (formerly DRI-WEFA), FAPRI 2005 U.S. And World Agricultural Outlook.

Begional GDP Growth Projections




Source: International Financial Statistics January 2005 and projections after 2004 are from Global Insight (formerly DRI-WEFA),FAPRI 2005 U.S. And World Agricultural Outlook

Regional GDP Growth Projections




Source: International Financial Statistics January 2005 and projections after 2004 are from Global Insight (formerly DRI-WEFA),FAPRI 2005 U.S. And World Agricultural Outlook.

U.S. Agricultural Trade, 1970 - 2005E




Source: U.S. Trade Internet System, www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade

U.S. Tariffs, 1789-2004



World Average Agricultural Tariffs, 2002



Source: WTO & ERS/USDA



U.S. Trade Strategy

Unilateral

- Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
- **□** CBI/CBERA
- African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA)

Regional/Bilateral

NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, Others


Concurrent Initiatives

Multilateral

- World Trade Organization
- Only Forum Where All 148 Countries Are Present & Farm Policy Is Negotiated



Progress to Date





Trade Agreements In-Place (7)

- **Israel**-1985-1994
- **Canada-**US (CUSTA)-1989-1998
- North America (NAFTA)-1994-2008
 - US-Mexico
 - **US-Canada**
 - Canada-Mexico

- Jordan-December17, 2001-2010
- **Chile-**January 1, 2004-2015
- **Singapore**-May 6 2003-2012
- Australia-January 1,2005-2022



Trade Agreements-Pending (9)

- Morocco-President Signed 8/17/04, Pending Signature, King of Morocco
- CAFTA-DR-Signed by President, Passed El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras (20 Years)
- Bahrain-Pending Submission to Congress

- Panama-Nine Negotiating Sessions Held, Panama Delays
- Colombia, Ecuador, Peru (ANDEAN)-Nine Rounds, Negotiations Continue
- Thailand-Three Rounds Held



Trade Agreements-Pending (9)

- Southern African Customs Union (SACU): Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa-Six Rounds Held
- Oman-Two Rounds of Negotiations Held, Part of Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA)
- United Arab Emirates-Two Rounds Held, part of MEFTA



Why Regional Agreements?

- 2d Best After MTN
 - **WTO Has Been Slower than Desired**
 - Outcome is Uncertain
- Economic Incentives
 - Open Markets
- Keep Pressure on MTN to Perform
- Any One Agreement-Small Impact,Taken Together-Large Impact



Strategic Considerations

- Secure Key Strategic Materials
 Oil, Fertilizer, Natural Gas
- Stem Illegal Immigration by Creating Economic Opportunity in Other Countries
- Create 'Buffer Zone' Against Terrorism (Thomas Barnett & 9/11 Commission Report)



Doha Development Agenda in the World Trade Organization (2001-?

Preparing for the Hong Kong Ministerial

December 8-13, 2005

Three Pillars of Trade Reform (Agreed in Concept August 1, 2004)

- Market Access: Reductions in Tariffs
- **Export Competition:** Elimination of Export Subsidies
- Trade Distorting Domestic
 Support: Reductions Over Time



Market Access

- Highest Tariffs Cut the Most
 - U.S. Pushing for Deep Tariff Cuts by Developing Countries (60-75%)
- **Issue: Many Developing Countries Want 'Special' Treatment & Some Reluctant to Agree to Large Cuts
- Much Left 'To Be Negotiated' & A Potential 'Deal Breaker'



Export Competition

- *Reduce & Eliminate Export Subsidies by Date Certain (Agreed)
 - EU Export Subsidies, \$2+ Billion/Year
 - ** U.S. Export Credit Guarantees > 180 Days
- Food Aid to Be Disciplined
- Strong Support for Export Competition Reforms


Trade Distorting Domestic Support

Programs that Cause Production to Be Different than Would Be Without Programs

- Year 1 Cut of 20%
- Subsequent Phased Reductions
 - 40-50% Range
- *Reductions from *Allowable* Support
- **Issue: Developing Countries Wanted Cuts Now, Tariff Reductions Later
- If Big 3 Don't Make Substantial Cuts, A 'Deal Breaker'


Agricultural Producer Support By Country 1986-88 and 2001-03

-Percent of Total Farm Receipts from Government-




Source: OECD's database (see www.oecd.org)

Total Allowable Trade Distorting Domestic Support, 'The Big 3,' 2002




WTO, Trade Policy Review and calculations.






Total Trade Distorting Domestic Support Assuming 50 Percent Reduction



Calculated

Real Income Effects of Liberalization of Global Merchandise Trade, by Country, 2015


-Impacts in 2015 Relative to the Baseline (2001 dollars)-



Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.3)

Impacts of Doha on Agricultural Output and





Source: Anderson, Martin and van Mensbrugghe (2005a, Tables 12.12 and 12.13)

Trade Liberalization Impacts on Factor Prices, 2015

	Skilled Wages	Unskilled Wages Percent (Land Owner Rent Change	Inflation
EU 25	1.3	-0.1	-71	-1.2
United States	0.2	0	-24	-0.3
Japan	2.4	1.5	-67.2	-0.2
Korea and Taiwan	7.8	7.3	-45.8	-1.3
Brazil	1.4		rge / 35.9	2.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	5.7	8.4	6.4	-4.3
Thailand	6.3	13.4	12.5	-0.2
Vietnam	15.1	23.3	5.8	-0.2
New Zealand	1.1	3.5	20.9	1.5

Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.7).



Conclusions and Implications



Conclusions & Implications

- ♣ U.S. Market Is Open, Rest of World Is Not♣ U.S. Export Growth Lags Import Growth
- Agricultural Trade Distorted by *Tariffs*, Export *Subsidies*, Trade Distorting *Domestic Support*
- U.S. Pushing for Deep Tariff Cuts by Developing Countries To Open More Markets for U.S. Exports
- Little Agreement on How Much Tariffs Might Be Cut



Conclusions & Implications

- Reductions in Trade Distorting Domestic Support Likely Substantial
 - Some Adjustment for U.S. Producers
- Absent WTO Progress, World Trade & Economic Growth Stifled, Especially in Agriculture-Not Good for U.S. Agriculture
- Cotton Case Could Figure in Outcome
 - U.S. Response
 - Other Cases (Rice, Soybeans??)
- Trade Reform is at a Crossroads: Protection or Progress?
 - If Export Markets Are Important, Trade Agreements & WTO Progress Are Necessary



Thank You!



Questions?



Parr Rosson

Department of Agricultural Economics

Texas A&M University

College Station, TX 77843-2124

E-mail: prosson@tamu.edu

Telephone: 979-845-3070